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CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURE UNDER THE ETHICS IN
GOVERNMENT ACT
Louis Bernard Jack*
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and indus-
trial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; elec-
tric light the most efficient policeman.**
On October 26, 1978, President Carter signed into law the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978 (E.G.A.).' Designed to "preserve and promote
the integrity of public officials and institutions,",2 the Act requires, inter
alia, that high-level federal officials make periodic public disclosure of
their personal finances and the finances of their spouses and dependent
children.3
In general terms, affected officials and their immediate families must
disclose the nature and sources of their outside income, property interests,
transactions and holdings, gifts, and liabilities.4 In most cases, dollar
amounts are to be reported in "value ranges"' rather than by exact
amounts. In addition, the identity of positions held in businesses or orga-
nizations (other than social, religious, fraternal or political organizations
and positions of a purely honorary nature) must be disclosed.6 The major
exceptions from disclosure are for income from and holdings in qualifying
* B.A., University of Rochester 1973; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center 1976;
Member, Pennsylvania and District of Columbia Bars; Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel,
Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C. The views ex-
pressed by the author are not necessarily those of the Department of the Treasury.
** L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLES' MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (Nat'l
Home Library Foundation ed. 1933).
1. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
2. Id, Preamble.
3. The Act also establishes an Office of Government Ethics (within the Office of Per-
sonnel Management); amends 18 U.S.C. § 207 to increase post-employment restrictions; cre-
ates a statutory mechanism for appointing a special prosecutor (28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598); and
establishes an Office of Senate Legal Counsel (2 U.S.C. § 288).
4. 5 U.S.C. app. § 202(a)-(e) (Supp. III 1979).
5. Id. § 202(a)(1)(B),-(d)(l).
6. Id § 202(a)(6)(A).
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"blind trusts," 7 as well as for gifts and income in certain nominal
amounts.8 Once submitted, the financial statements are to be checked for
conflicts of interest, and made available upon request to the public.9
The financial disclosure requirements for the legislative, executive and
judicial branches are found in Titles I, II, and III of the Act, respectively.
While the procedural and administrative provisions of the Act differ
among the three branches of government, most of the substantive disclo-
sure requirements are identical. Thus, notwithstanding three provisions
that apply only to the executive branch,'" the financial disclosure require-
ments of Titles I, II and III are sufficiently uniform to be considered to-
gether for the purpose of the following constitutional analysis."
I. PRIVACY
The existence of a constitutional right of privacy flowing from the vari-
ous provisions of the Bill of Rights is now well-established.' 2 While the
existence of the right is clear, the application of the right to personal
financial privacy is unsettled. In extremely personal matters involving
family decisions-where the right of privacy is strongest-the courts have
7. Id § 202(f).
8. Id §202(a)(l)-(6).
9. Id §§ 205, 206.
10. Section 202(a)(6)(B) requires nonelected reporting executive officials to disclose in
their initial reports any outside earnings of more than $5,000 received from any one source
during either of the two preceding calendar years. Specifically, the identity of the source
and the nature of the services performed by the reporting individual are to be disclosed.
However, information considered confidential as a result of a legally recognized privilege
(e.g., doctor-patient, attorney-client) need not be disclosed.
Section 202(1)(4)(B) provides that assets held in qualifying blind trusts for presidential
appointees and their families will not be subject to conffict of interest statutes such as 18
U.S.C. § 208. Therefore, such assets need not be divested. According to the conference re-
port, this provision was intended to facilitate the appointment of individuals with "well-
diversified assets" whose "position will involve decisions touching on a broad range of issues
affecting a large number of subject areas." S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1978).
Section 210 limits the outside earned income of certain presidential appointees to no more
than 15% of their government salary per year.
11. For the sake of convenience, statutory citations which follow are to the disclosure
provisions of Title II of the Act. Title II has been codified in the appendix to 5 U.S.C. app.
§§ 201-211 (Supp. III 1979). Implementing regulations have been published by the Office of
Personnel Management at 5 C.F.R. § 734 (1981).
12. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the retained rights of the people under the ninth amendment); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom of association under the first amendment); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth
amendment).
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tolerated very little government interference.13 However, the courts have
traditionally interpreted the Constitution to permit considerable govern-
ment regulation and scrutiny of financial matters. 4 The right of financial
privacy, then, is inherently limited. Moreover, the public servant's legiti-
mate expectation of financial privacy is even narrower than that of a coun-
terpart in the private sector. 5 The Supreme Court, however, has made no
definitive rulings on the nature of a constitutional right to financial pri-
vacy.
In California Bankers Association v. Shultz,' 6 a decision upholding the
recordkeeping and disclosure requirements imposed by the Bank Secrecy
Act of 1970, Justice Powell wrote in a concurring opinion:
A significant extension of the regulations' reporting require-
ments, however, would pose substantial and difficult constitu-
tional questions for me. In their full reach, the reports apparently
authorized by the open-ended language of the Act touch upon
intimate areas of an individual's personal affairs. Financial
transactions can reveal much about a person's activities, associa-
tions, and beliefs. At some point, governmental intrusion upon
these areas would implicate legitimate expectations of privacy. 17
In Buckley v. Valeo,18 the Supreme Court upheld the financial disclosure
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act, finding that the substan-
tial public interests served by disclosure outweighed the burden on polit-
ical contributors' first amendment rights.' 9
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled definitively on public em-
ployees' right to financial privacy, many state courts have considered pri-
vacy attacks on state financial disclosure statutes. The majority of these
decisions have upheld the constitutionality of disclosure statutes.2 ° In
Plante v. Gonzales,2 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit became the
only federal court to rule authoritatively on the constitutionality of a state
financial disclosure statute. In a subsequent case, Duplantier v. United
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. California Banker's Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
15. Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d 1119, 1135-36 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1129 (1979); O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914
(1977).
16. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
17. Id at 78-79.
18. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
19. Id at 60-84.
20. See Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d at 1124 n.8 (citing cases in which the courts of 11
of 14 states upheld various disclosure statutes).
21. 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979). See notes 31-35
and accompanying text infra.
19811
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States,2 2 the Fifth Circuit rejected challenges based on separation of pow-
ers, right of privacy, equal protection and due process, and upheld the con-
stitutionality of mandatory financial disclosure by federal judges under the
Ethics in Government Act.23
The courts have struggled to decide which standard of judicial review to
apply when deciding the constitutionality of financial disclosure statutes.
A minority of courts have found financial privacy to be a "fundamental"
constitutional right entitled to the benefit of strict scrutiny.24 Such courts
permit governmental intrusion into financial privacy only if every aspect of
the intrusion is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest
and no alternatives less subversive to constitutional rights are available.25
Other courts have noted that the Supreme Court has never expressly
recognized financial privacy to be a fundamental right entitled to special
constitutional protection.26 These decisions have therefore applied a more
lenient standard of review. For example, in Hunter v. City 0/New York,27
the court found that: "[T]he test is whether the means employed [by the
statute] are 'reasonable and appropriate' to accomplish its legitimate pur-
poses. . . .Under this method of review, challenged legislation will not be
set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." 28
Under this mere rationality standard, a court will typically refuse to ex-
amine the "who, what and how of disclosure" required by the statute.29
22. 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 608 F.2d 1373 (1979), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 854 (1981).
23. 606 F.2d at 666-73.
24. See note 25 infra.
25. See City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3rd 259, 268, 466 P.2d 225, 232, 85
Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 (1970); Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Questions 2-
10), 242 N.W.2d 3,20 (1976); Slevin v. City of New York, 477 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). Each of these cases invalidated a financial disclosure statute which demanded as
much information from minor officials as from high officials.
26. See Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 I11. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9 (1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974); Stein v. Howlet, 52 Ill. 2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972),
appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 925 (1973); Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 336 A.2d
97 (1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 901 (1976); Hunter v. City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d
562, 391 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1976), modified, 58 A.D.2d 136, 396 N.Y.S.2d 186 (App.
Div. 1977), aff'd 44 N.Y.2d 708, 376 N.E.2d 928, 405 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1978); Fritz v. Gorton,
83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902 (1974); In re Kading,
70 Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975).
27. 88 Misc. 2d 562, 391 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1976), modfied, 58 A.D.2d 136, 396
N.Y.S.2d 186 (App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 44 N.Y.2d 708, 376 N.E.2d 928, 405 N.Y.S.2d 455
(1978).
28. Id at 572, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 297 (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 572, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 298. See also Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker,
57 111. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974) (executive order requir-
ing financial disclosure statements of employees of only certain state agencies not violative
[Vol. 30:583
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Unlike the majority of state court decisions,3" the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion in Plante v. Gonzalez concluded that financial privacy is specially pro-
tected by the Constitution.3 The Plante court identified two separate
components of the constitutional right to privacy: the right to autonomy in
personal or family decision-making and the right to confidentiality.3" The
"autonomy" branch of privacy involves "matters relating to marriage, pro-
creation, contraception, family relationships and child rearing and educa-
tion."33 In cases involving the autonomy branch of privacy, state actions
are strictly scrutinized to determine whether they are the least restrictive
means to reach a compelling state interest.34 The Plante court noted that:
Disclosure laws, unlike laws banning contraception, miscegena-
tion, or abortion, do not remove any alternatives from the deci-
sion-making process. Their effect on financial decisions is more
indirect. They might deter some decisions. More basically, how-
ever, disclosure laws do not involve decisions as important as
those in the earlier decided cases. . . . While disclosure may
have some influence on intimate decision-making, we conclude
that any influence does not rise to the level of a constitutional
problem."
While citing the Plante decision, a federal district court in New York
nevertheless reached the opposite conclusion. In Slevin v. City of New
York ,36 the court noted the existence of a number of constitutional inter-
of equal protection, but is a rational classification within the purpose of the order); Mont-
gomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 336 A.2d 97 (1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 901
(1976) (requiring financial disclosure of elected but not paid members of boards, commis-
sions and committees did not violate equal protection since there could have been a rational
basis for the distinction).
30. See note 20 supra.
31. 575 F.2d 1119, 1136 (5th Cir. 1978).
32. Id at 1128. The court noted that the Supreme Court first drew this distinction in
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). The Plante court quoted the following language from
Whalen: "The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact involved at
least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions." 429 U.S. at 598-600.
33. Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d at 1129, quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713
(1976). As the Plante court noted, the Supreme Court has limited the power of the states to
regulate conduct in these areas. 575 F.2d at 1129. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 65-66 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. Using such scrutiny, the Supreme Court has voided regulations dealing with contra-
ception, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); and miscegenation, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
35. 575 F.2d at 1130-31.
36. 477 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (preliminarily enjoining city from enforcing
financial disclosure law against certain firemen and their spouses).
1981]
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ests that could be infringed upon by financial disclosure laws including:
[T]he right to privacy, in its many facets,-financial, marital, fa-
milial .. . and freedom of association, of belief, and of
speech. . . .These interests trigger important procedural protec-
tions including the doctrine that laws affecting fundamental in-
terests should be justified by at least substantial-and perhaps
compelling-state interests; that they be drawn narrowly to deal
only with the legitimate state interests at stake; and that they be
sufficiently clear to provide adequate guidance to individuals in-
terested in complying.37
The court proceeded to find the New York law unnecessarily intru-
sive.3" The court's use of strict scrutiny analysis was appropriate, however,
only if the court was correct in assuming that financial disclosure interferes
with a fundamental constitutional right. This assumption is in direct con-
flict with the view of the Fifth Circuit in Plante39 and Duplantier40 that
financial disclosure laws are of a different, significantly less intrusive na-
ture than laws regulating such issues as marriage, procreation, and contra-
ception.4'
The confidentiality component of the constitutional right of privacy has
only recently begun to emerge. It has been defined in Whalen v. Roe 42 as
"the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." 43 In
Whalen, however, the Supreme Court did not address the standard to be
applied to public disclosure of confidential materials as required under a
statute. Later, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,44 the Court
recognized that former President Nixon had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his presidential records45 and allowed archivists to examine the
records to screen out personal materials.46 Again, public disclosure under
a statute was not involved.
In Plante v. Gonzales, the Fifth Circuit applied the constitutional right to
37. Id at 1055-56 (citations omitted).
38. Id at 1057-58.
39. 575 F.2d at 1132.
40. 606 F.2d at 670.
41. However, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975), the Supreme Court recognized
that a statute requiring disclosure of political contributions was a burden on the first amend-
ment right of freedom of association. Therefore, the statute had to be strictly scrutinized to
insure that it was the "least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and
corruption that Congress found to exist." 424 U.S. at 68.
42. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
43. Id at 599.
44. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
45. Id at 457.
46. Id at 465.
[Vol. 30:583
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confidentiality to a Florida public financial disclosure statute which was
very similar to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. 4" With regard to the
appropriate standard of review, the court observed that the Supreme Court
"has clearly recognized that the privacy of one's personal affairs is pro-
tected by the Constitution."48 The court used a balancing test whereby a
public financial disclosure statute is valid if it "significantly promotes" im-
portant state goals.49 In Duplantier v. United States, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the E.G.A. substantially furthered legitimate governmental
interests which outweighed the incidental intrusion into the financial pri-
vacy of federal judges.5"
The interests promoted by the E.G.A. were summarized in the legisla-
tive history:
(1) to restore public confidence in the integrity of top govern-
ment officials and the government as a whole;
(2) to demonstrate the high level of integrity of most govern-
ment officials;
(3) to deter conflicts of interests;
(4) to deter undesirables from entering government service;
and
(5) to enable the public to evaluate the performance of officials
in light of their outside financial interests.5
Similar statutory goals have been recognized by the courts as compelling
governmental interests.5 2 Moreover, the majority of decisions in this area
have concluded that, while financial privacy is a serious matter deserving
strong protection, the public interests supporting public disclosure are even
stronger.53 Thus, it appears clear that mandatory financial disclosure is, at
least in principle, constitutional, although the features of each statute's
financial disclosure plan vary, and, according to Plante, "[e]ach of these
features must be individually examined, [and] its incremental benefits bal-
anced against the added violation of the officials' privacy."
5 4
Unlike the statute in Plante which applied only to elected officials, the
47. 575 F.2d at 1123.
48. Id at 1134.
49. Id
50. 606 F.2d at 670-71.
51. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 4237, 4238.
52. See, e.g., Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d at 1134; Goldtrap v. Askew, 334 So. 2d 20, 22
(Fla. 1976); Stein v. Howlett, 52 I11. at 577-78, 289 N.E.2d at 413; Montgomery County v.
Walsh, 274 Md. at 514, 336 A.2d at 105.
53. Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d at 1136.
54. Id
1981]
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E.G.A. also applies to political appointees and regular public employees."5
This is permissible because the E.G.A. is intended to preserve and promote
not only the integrity of elected officials, but also that of the government as
a whole. Regardless of whether public officials are elected or appointed,
they have taken upon themselves the responsibilities of public service and
concomitant limitations on personal privacy. 6 While drawing the bottom
line at the GS-16 level is somewhat arbitrary,57 it is nonetheless rational
since courts have upheld similar provisions applying to even lower job
classifications.58
The requirement that personal financial information be disclosed to the
public is essential to accomplish the ambitious first, second and fifth goals
of the E.G.A. listed above. Moreover, the decisions acknowledge that the
various compelling purposes of public financial disclosure-such as restor-
ing public confidence in government officials--outweigh public officials'
ever-diminishing legitimate expectation of privacy. 9
Another possible concern is that the federal officials covered by the
E.G.A. are required to disclose financial information pertaining to their
spouses and dependent children.6' The necessity for "family disclosure"
was explained in County *of Nevada v. MacMillen :61
Common sense tells us that although an official may have no eco-
nomic interest in [the property of a spouse or child], nevertheless
he may react favorably, or without total objectivity, to a proposal
which could materially enhance the value of that property. Dis-
55. 5 U.S.C. app. § 201(a)-(f) (Supp. III 1979).
56. Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d at 670.
57. Cf. Comer v. City of Mobile, 337 So. 2d 742, 752-53 (Ala. 1976) (a provision in a
state ethics statute requiring certain public officials in cities whose populations were greater
than 15,000 to file disclosure statements was held to be arbitrary and capricious).
58. See, e.g., Gideon v. Alabama State Ethics Comm'n, 379 So. 2d 570 (Ala. 1980)
(upholding statute with $15,000 threshold); Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 336
A.2d 97 (1974) (upholding a statute that covered "a broad range of governmental officials
and employees who exercise significant governmental authority, whether they be elected or
appointed"); Hunter v. City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d 562, 391 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
(upholding a disclosure statute that applied to city officials earning $25,000 a year or more).
59. See Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d at 670; Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d at
1135-36; County of Nevada v. MacMillen, II Cal. 3d 662, 671 n.7, 522 P.2d 1345, 1350 n.7,
114 Cal. Rptr. 345, 350 n.7 (1974); Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 Ill. 2d at 526,
315 N.E.2d at 16; Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 129 N.J. Super. 327, 323 A.2d 537, 540 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1974), aft'd, 140 N.J. Super. 250, 261, 356 A.2d 35, 41-42 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976);
Hunter v. City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d at 577-78, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 301. See also Fritz v.
Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d at 294-99, 517 P.2d at 923-25 (discussing the public's emerging right to
know in the first amendment context: "[The right to receive information is the fundamental
counterpart of the right of free speech.").
60. 5 U.S.C. app. § 202(e)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
61. 11 Cal. 3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1974).
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closure might substantially inhibit any such sympathetic reaction,
thereby promoting the act's goal of honesty and impartiality in
government.62
The court ruled that while the statute infringed upon the privacy of the
official's family, the public's interest in honest, impartial government offi-
cials outweighed the interest of privacy in financial affairs.63 Thus, family
disclosure has been held a reasonable and necessary adjunct to disclosure
by public officials.' 4
In addition to requiring financial information about a public official's
immediate family, the E.G.A. also requires information about sources of
an official's outside earnings and the nature of service performed for such
earnings. Similar statutory provisions have been attacked for indirectly
requiring the disclosure of legally privileged information.65 For example,
such a statute could require a public official who also practices psychiatry
to disclose the names of his clients, thereby breaching the doctor-patient
privilege and violating patient privacy. The "secondary source" problem is
avoided in the E.G.A. by a provision excepting from disclosure "any infor-
mation which is considered confidential as a result of a privileged relation-
ship, established by law."66
As mentioned at the outset of this article, most of the financial informa-
tion required by the E.G.A. may be disclosed in the form of "value catego-
ries."6 7 However, in the case of certain gifts68 and specified forms of
62. Id at 676, 522 P.2d at 1353, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 353. The commonality of financial
interests between government employees and their families is also reflected in 18 U.S.C.
§ 208, a criminal conflict of interest statute that prohibits federal employees from participat-
ing in matters in which they know their spouses or dependent children have a pecuniary
interest.
63. Id at 671, 522 P.2d at 1350, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
64. See also Gideon v. Alabama State Ethics Comm'n, 379 So. 2d at 575; County of
Nevada v. MacMillen, 11 Cal. 3d at 676, 522 P.2d at 1353, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 353; Illinois
State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 Ill. 2d at 527-28, 315 N.E.2d at 17; Stein v. Howlett, 52
Ill.2d at 570, 289 N.E.2d at 409; Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 N.W.2d at 518, 336 A.2d
at 107-08; Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 P.A. 227 (Questions 2-10), 396
Mich. at 506-07, 242 N.W.2d at 20; Hunter v. City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d at 574, 391
N.Y.S.2d at 299; Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d at 294, 517 P.2d at 923; In re Kading, 70 Wisc.
at 527-28, 235 N.W.2d at 418.
65. Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d at 1137; Labor's Educ. and Political Club v. Danforth,
561 S.W.2d 339, 349-50 (Mo. 1977); Hunter v. City of New York, 88 Misc. at 570-71, 391
N.Y.S.2d at 296-97.
66. 5 U.S.C. app. § 202(a)(6)(B) (Supp. III 1979).
67. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. By utilizing these categories, an official
need not report the exact value of income received but may approximate the value by plac-
ing the item within a dollar amount range. For instance, under § 202(a)(l)(B), income from
dividends, rent, interest, and capital gains are to be reported in the following categories:
(i) not more than $1,000,
1981]
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income,69 exact dollar amounts or good faith estimates are required.
Several state courts have virtually conditioned the constitutionality of
financial disclosure statutes on their use of value ranges rather than exact
dollar amounts.7" In Plante, the Fifth Circuit rejected an argument by
Florida state senators that all of the benefits of the disclosure statute could
be accomplished without resort to specific figures. 7 ' The court ruled that,
"[w]hile sufficiently narrow ranges would convey much useful information,
increasing the specificity will increase the value of the information.,
72
Furthermore, "[wihile the incremental benefit may be slight, the incremen-
tal harm is even slighter., 73
Alternatively, it could be argued that the naked certainty of exact
amounts leaves nothing to the imagination and is, at least philosophically,
far more intrusive than even the scantiest value ranges. In any event, most
of the E.G.A.'s disclosure requirements are directed toward value catego-
ries and a completed financial report falls far short of a net worth state-
ment. Thus, while systematic requirements for exact figures would
produce valuable information, there is little or nothing to be gained from
requiring, as the E.G.A. does, the disclosure of exact amounts in only a
few instances. Nevertheless, the few instances of exact amount disclosure
probably do not amount to an unconstitutional intrusion.
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In a sense, we have already touched upon the fourth amendment's right
(ii) greater than $1,000 but not more than $2,500,
(iii) greater than $2,500 but not more than $5,000,
(iv) greater than $5,000 but not more than $15,000,
(v) greater than $15,000 but not more than $50,000,
(vi) greater than $50,000 but not more than $100,000,
(vii) greater than $100,000.
68. 5 U.S.C. app. § 202(a)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1979). Included within this category are all
gifts with a fair market value of $36 or more other than transportation, lodging, food or
entertainment, received from any source other than a relative, and aggregating $100 or more
in value.
69. Id § 202(a)(I)(A). Included within this category is all income received from any
source other than a current United States government salary, dividends, rents, interest and
capital gains.
70. See County of Nevada v. MacMillen, II Cal. 3d at 671, 522 P.2d at 1350, 114 Cal.
Rptr. at 350; Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 II. 2d at 527, 315 N.E.2d at 17;
Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. at 502, 336 A.2d at 97; Klaus v. Minnesota State
Ethics Comm'n, 209 Minn. 430, 437, 244 N.W.2d 672, 676 (1976); In re Kading, 70 Wis. at
528, 235 N.W.2d at 418.
71. 575 F.2d at 1136.
72. Id
73. Id
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to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, because this right is
also a component of constitutional privacy.74 Having found the E.G.A.'s
disclosure requirements to be a reasonable intrusion into the financial pri-
vacy of public servants, it would appear that this scheme of mandatory
disclosure could only be characterized as a reasonable search. The fourth
amendment, of course, does not prohibit reasonable searches.
75
Few cases have dealt with financial disclosure as a search and seizure.
In O'Brien v. DiGrazia,76 several Boston policemen were ordered to com-
plete an extensive financial questionnaire after their names had been
found on a list in the possession of a man known to be involved in orga-
nized crime. The Police Commissioner demanded financial information
only after he had cause to suspect the patrolmen's integrity. Upholding the
constitutionality of the forced disclosure, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit ruled that: "even if the Fourth Amendment applies to this sort of
intrusion, the Commissioner's order is not so lacking in justification as to
be an 'unreasonable' invasion of the patrolmen's 'legitimate expectation of
privacy.' 77 In a footnote, the court further stated: "Even in the absence
of any basis for suspicion on the part of the Commissioner, a requirement
that police officers reveal their finances to the Commissioner serves the
public interest in an honest force."78
In line with the preceding comments on the right to privacy, it follows
that the system of compulsory financial disclosure set forth in the E.G.A.
does not violate the fourth amendment. The legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy of public servants-like that of the police officers in DeGrazia-is
limited by the positions of responsibility they hold.79
III. OVERBREADTH
The overbreadth doctrine is based on the principle that "a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state reg-
74. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
75. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
76. 544 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
77. Id at 546 (citations omitted).
78. Id at 546 n.4. Seealso Moyer v. Bronwell, 137 F. Supp. 594, 605-06 (E.D. Pa. 1956)
(the fourth amendment does not prohibit the government from using an IRS employee's
mandatory financial disclosure report in a prosecution for making false statements on the
same report); Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of PA 270 (Questions 2-10), 396 Mich.
at 483, 242 N.W.2d at 21 (if compelled financial disclosure is a search, it is a reasonable
search within the fourth amendment if it is accomplished by the least intrusive method).
79. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 425, 455, 465; Plante v.
Gonzalez, 575 F.2d at 1135-36.
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ulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."8 Recent Supreme
Court rulings have limited the application of the overbreadth doctrine to
the first amendment context, however, and then only if the overbreadth is
"substantial [when] judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep." 8'
Nevertheless, several cases considering the legality of financial disclo-
sure statutes have spoken in terms of overbreadth. In City of Carmel-by-
the-Sea v. Young,82 a California disclosure law was set aside in its entirety
because it was overbroad and violative of privacy. Among the provisions
at issue was a requirement for public disclosure of the nature and extent of
all investments of spouses and minor children in excess of $10,000. The
California Supreme Court found the provision overbroad because "no ef-
fort [had been] made to relate the disclosure to financial dealings or assets
which might be expected to give rise to a conflict of interest."83 The court
required that there be some "rational connection with. . . the functions or
jurisdiction of any particular agency, .. or the functions or jurisdiction
of any particular public officer or employee. 84
In support of its analysis, the California court cited Shelton v. Tucker,5
a landmark overbreadth decision. There, the Supreme Court held that
"even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental per-
sonal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."86
A subsequent version of the California disclosure statute was upheld in
County of Nevada v. Maclillen .8 The new law was held to contain suffi-
cient assurances against "unnecessary intrusions into personal privacy. 88
In addition to eliminating an exact dollar amount disclosure requirement,
the legislature excepted from disclosure any interest which "could not be
affected materially by any action, failure to act or decision taken by the
public official acting within the scope of his official duties. 89
80. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
81. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). See also Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60 (1975); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
216 (1975); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974).
82. 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
83. Id at 269, 466 P.2d at 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
84. Id
85. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
86. Id at 488.
87. 11 Cal. 3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1974).
88. Id at 672, 522 P.2d at 1350, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
89. Id at 675, 522 P.2d at 1353, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
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In an advisory opinion by the Supreme Court of Michigan, 9° a financial
disclosure statute was found overbroad because it demanded the same de-
gree of financial disclosure from the governor of the state as it did from a
city clerk, despite differences in their spheres of influence and differences
in the ranges of situations presenting potential conflicts of interest. 91
Like the Michigan statute, the E.G.A. takes an across-the-board ap-
proach to financial disclosure, such that a GS-16 is obliged to divulge the
same categories of information as the President of the United States. It
would be simplistic, however, to require less disclosure from the GS-16,
simply because his or her position affords fewer possibilities for conflicts of
interest. As the court in Lehrhaupt v. Fynn92 stated:
Overbreadth is not tested by the number of items required to be
disclosed or by the depth of inquiry. The constitutional validity
of such an ordinance from the viewpoint of overbreadth is rather
tested by a rational relationship between the legislative purpose
and the disclosure requirements and whether the full objective of
the regulation can be achieved by any other more limited
means.
93
In a different approach to overbreadth, the court in Hunter v. City of
New York9 4 held that a New York financial disclosure statute violated due
process because it failed to allow reporting employees an opportunity to
challenge the need for public disclosure of personal financial matters unre-
lated to employees' jobs. The court recognized that there are financial
matters which are so personal and so unrelated to a public servant's re-
sponsibilities that no useful purpose could be served by its disclosure. The
court noted that "[t]he right to shield from one's friends as well as one's
critics details that have no bearing whatsoever upon the performance of
the employee's duties should be accorded to the employee." 95
While allowing up to sixty days for the agency to review the reports,96
90. Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Questions 2-10), 396 Mich.
465, 242 N.W.2d 3 (1976).
91. Id at 506, 242 N.W.2d at 19-20.
92. 140 N.J. Super. 250, 356 A.2d 35 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (affirming a lower
court's decision to uphold a local financial disclosure ordinance).
93. Id at 264, 356 A.2d at 43.
94. 58 A.D.2d 136, 396 N.Y.S.2d 186 (App. Div. 1977), af9d, 44 N.Y.2d 108, 376 N.E.2d
928, 405 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1978).
95. Id at 141, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 189. See also Evans v. Carey, 53 A.D.2d 109, 385
N.Y.S.2d 965 (App. Div. 1976), aft'd, 40 N.Y.2d 1008, 359 N.E.2d 983, 391 N.Y.S.2d 393
(1976) (upholding an executive order for financial disclosure which established a Board of
Public Disclosure to review completed financial reports prior to public disclosure and to
evaluate specific privacy claims).
96. 5 U.S.C. app. § 206(a) (Supp. III 1979).
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the E.G.A. requires that executive branch financial reports be made avail-
able for public disclosure within fifteen days after having been received by
the agency.97 Thus, there is no statutory requirement that reports be re-
viewed before they are made available to the public.98 Furthermore, the
E.G.A. does not provide a generally available mechanism for privacy or
relevancy challenges prior to publication.99
Thus, a liberal court might be sympathetic to a due process attack on the
E.G.A.'s failure either to provide for prepublication agency review or for
an opportunity to assert specific privacy claims.' 00 Although the legisla-
ture could not have tailored the E.G.A.'s disclosure requirements to each
covered individual, the Office of Government Ethics could be given au-
thority' o ' to review employee privacy claims. Opponents of such adminis-
trative review probably would argue that such a procedure would be
overly burdensome and costly, subject to abuse for delaying tactics, and
that a uniform disclosure policy would be fairer to all concerned.
In Slevin v. City of New York, 10 2 members of the New York City Fire
Department challenged the constitutionality of a law requiring financial
disclosure by all city employees and officials earning more than $30,000
per year. The plaintiff class of battalion chiefs, deputy chiefs, medical of-
ficers and their spouses argued that, because their positions in the fire de-
partment gave them little opportunity for graft, they should not be asked
to make financial disclosures as extensive as those required of politicians,
policy-makers and other officials with greater opportunity for involvement
in corrupt practices. 0 3
97. Id § 205(b).
98. The Act does not specify deadlines for review of reports filed by legislative
(§ 105(a)) and judicial (§ 306(a)) officials.
99. While there is no generally available waiver mechanism, some "special" govern-
ment employees who work less than 130 days of the calendar year can avoid the entire
reporting requirement if the Office of Government Ethics determines that conflicts of inter-
est are unlikely and public financial disclosure is unnecessary. See E.G.A. § 201(i) and 5
C.F.R. § 734.205 (1981). A waiver of the reporting requirement is also available for certain
gifts which are determined to be "purely personal." See E.G.A. § 202(a)(2)(D) and 5 C.F.R.
§ 734.303(g) (1981).
100. See, e.g., Slevin v. City of New York, 477 F. Supp. 1051, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 421 v. Schlesinger, 443 F. Supp. 431, 434
(D.D.C. 1978).
101. It may be argued that this authority has already been given. See 5 U.S.C. app.
§ 402(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979) (Authority and Functions of the Office of Government Ethics).
This section permits the Director of the Office of Government Ethics to develop and recom-
mend rules and regulations pertaining to ethics, conflicts of interest and procedures for filing
and reviewing financial statements in the executive branch.
102. 477 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
103. Id at 1056-57.
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The plaintiffs also objected to the requirement that their financial re-
ports be made available for public inspection without any showing of need
by persons wanting to see the reports. The court characterized the plain-
tiffs' concern about unnecessary embarassment as "especially worthy of
careful consideration" despite the fact that the law in question provided
for waiver of public disclosure for material determined by the Board of
Ethics to be of a "highly personal nature."' The court appeared to share
the plaintiffs' misgivings that there are "many things that would cause em-
barrassment which might not be deemed 'highly personal' by the Board of
Ethics."' 5 Furthermore, the New York law failed "to regulate the han-
dling of the reports and privacy claims or to specify punishments for indi-
viduals guilty of mishandling them."'0 6 The court found the New York
law overbroad and vague and preliminarily enjoined the city from enforc-
ing the law against the plaintiffs pending a final decision. 0 7 At this writ-
ing, no final ruling has been issued.
The Slevin court's strict scrutiny of a financial disclosure statute is
unique. The great majority of courts have refused to second-guess their
legislatures as to whether the information required to be disclosed is "nec-
essary," or whether the objectives of the statute could be met by less intru-
sive means. The majority approach was characteristically set forth in
Goldtrap v. Askew: °8
It was not necessary that the Legislature experiment with less in-
104. Id at 1057.
105. Id The court cited the following examples: a father who desires to raise his children
without disclosing to them that he is relatively wealthy; a divorced individual who is trying
to avoid disclosing to a former spouse that he or she has been able to acquire substantial
assets; a person who is trying to avoid having friends and relatives ask to borrow money; a
person who desires to avoid being solicitated by salesmen. Id
106. Id at 1058. By way of comparison, § 205(b)(2) requires those who wish to examine
financial disclosure statements filed under the E.G.A. to identify themselves and to acknowl-
edge in writing the statute's prohibitions against misuse of the data disclosed. Section 205(c)
prescribes a $5,000 civil penalty for using a report:
(A) for any unlawful purpose;
(B) for any commercial purpose, other than by news and communications media
for dissemination to the general public;
(C) for determining or establishing the credit rating or any individual; or
(D) for use, directly or indirectly, in the solicitation of money for any political,
charitable, or other purpose.
5 U.S.C. app. § 205(c) (Supp. III 1979).
107. 417 F. Supp. 1051, 1058, 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
108. 334 So. 2d 20, 22 (Fla. 1976). Accord, Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57
Ill. 2d at 527, 315 N.E.2d at 19; Stein v. Howlett, 52 Il. 2d at 578, 289 N.E.2d at 413;
Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. at 519, 336 A.2d at 108; Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 129
N.J. Super. at 333, 323 A.2d at 540; Hunter v. City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d at 566-67,
N.Y.S.2d at 300; Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d at 300-01, 517 P.2d at 926.
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trusive or more particularized disclosure laws, or that less rigid
disclosure thresholds be established. In this area the Legislature
need only adopt a uniform code which requires disclosure of
matters reasonably relevant to the duties of public office. We
agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that it would be 'an
insurmountable legislative task to tailor disclosures to each of lit-
erally a myriad of public posts, and an anomaly to require each
individual to make a personal determination as to what items of
his financial affairs would be relevant." 0 9
Accordingly, a court considering the E.G.A. is not likely to utilize the
traditional overbreadth analysis of searching for less intrusive alternatives
to each disclosure requirement.
Consider, for example, the E.G.A.'s provisions in the problem area of
family disclosure. Gifts and reimbursements to the spouse need not be
reported if they were received "totally independent of the spouse's rela-
tionship to the reporting individual.""' The spouse's business or invest-
ment interests need not be reported if they fall within a three-part test for
ruling out involvement of the reporting official,"' and no disclosure need
be made with respect to spouses who are divorced or legally separated
from the reporting official." 2 Statutory exceptions such as these insure
that reporting officials are required to disclose only the information neces-
sary to accomplish one or more of the legitimate purposes of the legisla-
tion.
IV. VAGUENESS
A law requiring financial disclosure is not constitutionally valid unless
there is a substantial correlation between the information demanded and
potential conflicts of interest involving the reporting official.' Accord-
ingly, the requisite nexus must be defined in each statute. Several laws
which have attempted to insure comprehensive but not overbroad disclo-
sure have resorted to imprecise language and have been challenged on the
109. 334 So. 2d at 22 (citations omitted).
110. 5 U.S.C. app. § 202(e)(1)(B) and (C) (Supp. III 1979).
11I. Id § 202(e)(1)(D) excepts from disclosure items:
(i) which the reporting individual certifies represent the spouse's or dependent
child's sole financial interest or responsibility and which the reporting individual
has no knowledge of, (ii) which are not in any way, past or present, derived from
the income, assets, or activities of the reporting individual, and (iii) from which the
reporting individual neither derives, nor expects to derive, any financial or eco-
nomic benefit.
Id
112. Id § 202(e)(2).
113. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64.
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basis of vagueness.' 14
For example, in Dunphy v. Sheehan,115 a state law requiring public
financial disclosure was struck down for vagueness. The offending provi-
sion required disclosure of real estate interests located "within the jurisdic-
tion of the officer's public agency""' 6 but failed to define "jurisdiction."
The court stated:
Apparently, the public officer must make this decision for him-
self, and at the risk of being charged with perjury should his deci-
sion later be found erroneous. . . . The public office holder
should not have to guess regarding his duty to disclose. That
duty must be expressed clearly if criminal sanctions for breach
are authorized. "7
In an advisory opinion by the Supreme Court of Michigan, 8 a disclo-
sure provision requiring public officials to report "what they know or have
reason to know" about the finances of their immediate families, at the ex-
pense of criminal penalties-$ 1,000 fine, ninety days in jail, loss of office-
was found to "present very real problems of vagueness.""' 9 The court
ruled that the statutory language lacked the specificity necessary "to alert
individuals to the responsibility imposed upon them to discover the infor-
mation required to be disclosed."' 20
Only one of the E.G.A.'s disclosure provisions appears to present a seri-
114. A statute is void for vagueness if it "forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See also
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 76-78; Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 Ill. 2d at
514, 315 N.E.2d at 13-14; Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill. 2d at 575, 289 N.E.2d at 411; Hunter v.
City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d at 568, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
115. 92 Nev. 259, 549 P.2d 332 (1976).
116. Id at 263, 549 P.2d at 335.
117. Id
118. 396 Mich. 465, 242 N.W.2d 3.
119. Id at 507, 242 N.W.2d at 20.
120. Id (emphasis added). Cf Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 129 N.J. Super. 327, 323 A.2d 537
(Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (township ordinance requiring officials to disclose the finances of
their spouses-regardless of the potential nonavailability of such information under state
law-on pain of criminal penalties and loss of office, held unconstitutional; no specific doc-
trine cited.) This case is distinguishable because (1) the E.G.A. has no criminal penalties for
failure to disclose; (2) a provision requiring officials to make "every reasonable effort to
obtain the required information" from their spouses, initially found in S. 555, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 302(c)(2)(B) (1977), was dropped from the final version of E.G.A.; and (3) the
E.G.A. being a federal law, would most likely preempt any state laws protecting the confi-
dentiality of finances as between spouses. Cf. County of Nevada v. MacMillen, I 1 Cal. 3d at
676 n.ll, 522 P.2d at 1354 n.ll, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 354 n.I1 ("In the rare case in which the
information [about the spouse's financial interests] is withheld or truly unavailable following
a good faith effort to ascertain it, the official undoubtedly would be excused from a technical
failure to comply with the act.").
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ous question of vagueness. That provision excepts from disclosure gifts
and reimbursements received by an employee's spouse when the circum-
stances are "totally independent of the spouse's relationship to the report-
ing individual."' 12
1
Based on the legislative history, it appears that the E.G.A.'s "totally in-
dependent" reporting exception turns on the donor's motive. 2 This sub-
jective approach is unfortunate for two reasons. First, neither the
reporting individual nor the spouse is in a position to accurately determine
the intent of the donor. Second, it would be very difficult to disprove in
court a donor's stated donative motive or a donee's stated understanding
of the donor's motive. Nevertheless, while the E.G.A.'s "totally independ-
ent" provision is of questionable legislative wisdom, it is probably not so
unclear as to be unconstitutionally vague.
121. 5 U.S.C. app. § 202(e)(l)(B) (Supp. III 1979).
122. The legislative history indicates that the language in question was taken from the
H.R. 1, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), the House version of the E.G.A., as part of a conference
committee compromise on family disclosure. The conference reports, however, are silent on
the subject. See H.R. REP. No. 1756, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1978), reprintedin [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4216, 4381; S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1978).
Prior to H.R. 1, the "totally independent" language appeared in the never-enacted Legis-
lative Branch Disclosure Act of 1977. H.R. 7401, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC.
16246 (1977). Section 4(d)(l)(B) and (C) of that bill excepted from disclosure gifts and reim-
bursements received by a spouse "totally independent of, and... not in any way, directly
or indirectly, related to the spouse's relationship to the individual reporting." Id The
House Ethics Committee explained the provision as follows:
If such items are received by a spouse "because of' the relationship to the report-
ing individual, then they should be disclosed. However, if gifts or reimbursements
are received totally independent of any relationship to a Member of Congress, then
they are irrelevant to the purpose of disclosure; and need not be disclosed. For
instance, it would be ridiculous to require disclosure of any reimbursements a
spouse received while traveling on business trips or to require disclosure of an
award which the spouse received for a personal achievement totally unrelated to
the public official.
H.R. REP. No. 574, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1977) (citation omitted).
The committee's advisory opinion on the meaning of "indirect" gifts in House Rule XLIII
is also instructive:
A spouse or dependent may frequently receive a gift from an employer or another
person which is prompted by recognition of their services, friendship, or some
other consideration unrelated to the official responsibilities of the Member, officer,
or employee. When it is clear that such gifts are truly independent of the Member,
officer, or employee and would have been offered regardless of the donee's relation
to that person, such gifts-would not be considered as indirect gifts for purposes of
Rule XLIII. However, when it is apparent that the gift may not have been offered
butfor the donee's relation to a Member, officer, or employee, such a gift would
constitute an indirect gift to the Member, officer, or employee.
Id at 74-75.
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V. SELF-INCRIMINATION
The fifth amendment may not be asserted in every instance where the
government requires a person to disclose information.123 However, when
the government's questions are directed not at the public at large, but at a
"highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities" and the
area of inquiry is "permeated with criminal statutes," 124 the fifth amend-
ment privilege is a valid defense to a prosecution for failure to disclose.' 25
The financial report required by the E.G.A. is relatively neutral on its
face and is directed not at individuals but at their designated positions,
responsibilities or pay rate classifications. Accordingly, a total refusal to
file a financial report could not be justified by relying on the fifth amend-
ment. The privilege could, however, be properly asserted for particular
questions or in defense in a civil action 126 brought under E.G.A. section
304(a).
With few exceptions, 27 an individual's mere assertion of the privilege is
not grounds for removal from office. In Garrity v. New Jersey, 28 the
Supreme Court held that a public employee who answers investigatory
questions knowing that failure to answer would be grounds for removal
from office does not answer voluntarily, and in so answering does not
waive the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. Such ques-
tioning is said to be inherently coercive because it is "likely to exert such
pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and
rational choice."' 129 Because the government may not present employees
with "a choice between surrendering their constitutional rights or their
123. See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 428 (1971) (upholding statute requiring
motorists to stop and furnish their names and addresses after involvement in an automobile
accident); United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 260 (1927) (upholding statute requiring
the filing of tax returns).
124. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
125. Id (registration of communists); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (mari-
juana tax); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 47 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390
U.S. 62, 64 (1968) (wagering tax forms); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 98 (1968)
(registration of certain firearms used principally by gangsters). In each of these cases, the
Court found that mere compliance with the statutory disclosure requirements would give
rise to a substantial risk of self-incrimination.
126. The Supreme Court has held that the fifth amendment privilege may be properly
invoked in civil proceedings when there is a realistic threat of criminal prosecution. Lefko-
witz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
127. Recent Supreme Court dicta suggests that "a government policymaking official
holding office at the pleasure of the President" could be fired merely for invoking the fifth
amendment. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 808 and dissenting opinion by Ste-
vens, J. at 811.
128. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
129. Id. at 497.
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jobs,"' 3 ° it has been further held that a public employee may not be forced
to answer questions unless he or she is given so-called "use" immunity.'31
According to the use immunity doctrine, an employee may not be com-
pelled to answer potentially incriminating questions unless he is first "duly
advised of his options and the consequences of his choice"' 32 and is "ade-
quately assured of protection against the use of his answers or their fruits
in any criminal prosecution."'
133
To summarize, a public employee may not be fired for merely refusing
to answer potentially incriminating questions. However, if use immunity
is given, the employee must answer. Refusal to answer constitutes grounds
for dismissal. '31 If the employee answers, the information disclosed may
not be used in a criminal prosecution. The information may, however, be
used in administrative proceedings.
35
Furthermore, an employee who answers the questions on the financial
statement may not subsequently assert the fifth amendment privilege as to
the answers. The privilege must be asserted initially by refusal to answer
the questions or it is lost permanently. 36 Moreover, the privilege against
self-incrimination is a personal right, which may be asserted only by the
person threatened with prosecution. Thus, in a situation where a third
party, such as a spouse, would be incriminated by a required financial dis-
closure, the reporting individual could not assert the privilege on behalf of
the third party. Nor could the third party claim the privilege to prevent
the reporting individual from making the incriminating disclosure.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Constitution guarantees every person a legitimate expectation of
privacy from governmental intrusion. 138 This concept of a constitutional
130. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284 (1968).
131. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
132. Kalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d 1391, 1393 (Ct. CI. 1973), quoting Uniform San-
itation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 1970).
133. Id
134. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. at 283-85.
135. Id at 284.
136. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 665 (1976); United States v. Sullivan, 274
U.S. 259, 263 (1927).
137. United States v. Castillo, No. 75-2168, slip op. at 10 (4th Cir. Sept. 22, 1976) (un-
published per curiam opinion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977); United States v. Haddad,
527 F.2d 537, 539 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976), citing Johnson v. United
States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913), where Justice Holmes said: "[A] party is privileged from pro-
ducing the evidence, but not from its production." Id at 458.
138. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
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right of privacy has remained largely undefined. 139
Based upon decisions surveyed, mandatory financial disclosure for pub-
lic officials may be legislated in a constitutionally permissible fashion. Ac-
cording to the majority view, a financial disclosure statute will not infringe
the right of privacy if the required disclosures will reasonably promote one
or more compelling governmental interests. 140 A minority of courts would
further scrutinize the statutory provisions to ensure that they are the least
intrusive means of accomplishing the underlying purposes of the law. 141
As noted above, the court rulings on financial disclosure are instructive
but not dispositive. For example, Plante v. Gonzalez upheld financial dis-
closure by elected officials and Duplantier v. United States upheld financial
disclosure by appointed officials. These decisions could be disregarded if
the courts consider the E.G.A.'s reporting requirements for career civil ser-
vants. 1
42
139. Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d at 1127.
140. See notes 49-53 and accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 55-59 and accompanying text supra.
142. It is worth noting that six decisions upholding financial disclosure laws have been
upheld by the Supreme Court. Three of these constitutional appeals were dismissed for
want of a federal question. See Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill. 2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972);
Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 336 A.2d 97 (1975); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash.
2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974). Such dismissals are determinations on the merits and are there-
fore entitled to precedential value as decisions of the Supreme Court. See Mandel v. Brad-
ley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 322, 344 (1975); Plante v.
Gonzales, 575 F.2d at 1125. Although the provisions of the disclosure statutes reviewed by
the Supreme Court differ from those of the E.G.A., there is sufficient similarity to warrant a
conclusion that mandatory public financial disclosure by public servants in positions of high
responsibility is not per se violative of the Constitution.
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